Belarus: the View From Navan

By Colonel Dorcha Lee (Retd)

1. Protests in Belarus

The recent protests against the Lukashenko Regime started as a reaction to the Presidential Election held on the 9th August, where President Lukashenko was declared the winner with approximately 80% of the popular mandate. The Opposition has claimed that the elections were neither free nor fair. They are demanding that the results of the election be set aside and that fresh elections be held. The protests are peaceful in intent but are being broken up by anti-riot police using non-lethal means. Opposition spokespersons claim that about 7,000 people have been arrested, 100 are missing, and several hundred have been injured by police action. International media have verified the brutality of the police towards the protesters. A small number of Army personnel have been observed present at some demonstrations, but so far, they are not reported as being involved.

2. Election was not independently observed.

The Presidential Election was not observed by reliable independent electoral observation missions. Belarus national election observers are deemed compromised, as being mostly under control of the regime. The only international election observers present were from the CIS (Russian Federation), who have failed to report violations of electoral procedures in previous Belarussian elections. The main international observers that normally observe in Belarus are from the OSCE. However, despite prior notifications on the timelines involved being passed to the Government, the regime failed to issue the necessary invitation to the OSCE in time. In the absence of unbiased international observers, the EU nevertheless denounced the election. This would be based mainly on intelligence supplied by EU Missions and embassies, trusted media outlets and local sources with a track record of fair reporting over the years. While not unprecedented, it is unusual that the EU would take sides so quickly on an election, without the backup of a professional unbiased international election observation mission.

3. Protests in Russian and the Federation

The protests in Belarus are not isolated events in the region. Over the past three years or more, protests have taken place in over a hundred different cities, in Russia and the Federation. The protests are against corruption, anti-democratic authorities, repression of the media and for free and fair democratic expression. Faced with the continuing decline in living standards, due in part to fallen oil prices, people are becoming more desperate.

The most recent protests took place in Moscow, St Petersburg, Khabarovsk, Omsk, Komsomolsk na Amure, Ulyanovsk, Archangel, Kuzbas, Ishimbay (in Bashkiria), Irkutsk (Yakutiya), Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk.

4. Belarus and relationship with Russia

Belarus is very dependent on Russia especially for subsidised gas and oil. Nevertheless, Lukashenko has tried to keep some space between Belarus and Russia. He has resisted repeated attempts to form a closer economic union which Putin has been calling for. Lukashenka has also forged ties with the EU and even NATO. As recently as March, UK Royal Marine Commandos (special forces on a par with the Army Ranger Wing) have been training the Belarussian forces and participating in military exercises in Belarus.

The Belarussian opposition are maintaining that they are not pro-Russian or pro-EU. However, should the opposition be split, a faction could emerge that would lean sufficiently towards Russia.

Putin could accept the replacement of Lukashenko, and even a more democratic Belarus, if it stays close to Russia. Putin in very unlikely to stand idly by and watch a democratic regime in Belarus join with NATO and the EU. However, a successful ‘velvet’ revolution in Belarus could spark off uncontrollable demands for increased democracy in the Federation and potentially the overthrow of Putin himself.

There is also another consideration which should not be forgotten. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, between Lithuania and Poland, has long been seen as a potential flashpoint between Russia and the West. (See “War with Russia” by General Sir Richard Shirreff).

In the event of an emergency, the only land approaches to Kaliningrad from Russia lie across Belarus. It is in Russia’s strategic interests that it has good relations with whatever Government emerges in Minsk. A land-based military movement would still require Russia to violate Lithuanian territory. The extensive road network in Southern Lithuania would be essential for logistics support for any protracted Russian military operation to support Kaliningrad. Depending on the extent of hostilities, there are two broad military options: a rapid advance along the main axis, Minsk-Vilnius-Kaliningrad, or an infiltration north from Grodno into the Enclave.

In both scenarios, Russia would need cooperation from Belarus.

5. Belarus and relationship with the West

Lukashenko is currently alleging that the protests are inspired by NATO and the EU. He has sent additional Belarussian Army reinforcements to the Lithuanian and Polish Borders to offset any possible NATO threat. Three years ago, in response to threats issued by Russia, NATO deployed four multi-national battlegroups, one each to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These battlegroups, each comprising 1,000 to 1,200 personnel, are part of NATO’s ‘enhanced forward presence’ to act as a deterrent to possible Russian military action in the area. They are not sufficiently strong to change the balance of military power, however they would be able to quickly internationalise any possible military conflict.

The four battlegroups, even along with the armed forces of the four Baltic countries, do not constitute a credible offensive threat to Russia. Belarus is a different matter. If Lukashenko decided to use the Belarussian Army to hold on to power, military intervention by the West is possible, on humanitarian grounds. A Lithuanian proposal to plan for humanitarian corridors, in the event of a total collapse of Belarussian society, could be the catalyst for military action to protect such corridors, if extended deep into Belarus.

While the Trump Administration did agree to the deployment of NATO countries to the Baltic Countries, and also agreed to participate in the Polish-based battlegroup, Trump wants no confrontation with Putin. Moreover, Trump’s isolationist foreign policy has weakened NATO’s confidence in having US support, in the event of a major conflict in the region. The timing of the Belarus protests is also significant, in the final months of the US Presidential election campaign. Every four years, at this time, international politics is on hold, until the US sorts out its political succession.

The EU has potentially enormous influence, economically, on the situation in Belarus. At the present time, it has decided to channel modest funds to support the opposition. Economic sanctions against the Belarussian Government regime could have an impact on Lukashenko’s ability to hold onto power.

6. Conclusions

· Russia and the US will hold back for the moment and let the EU/ OSCE try for a political solution.

· The EU may offer to act as intermediary for a political solution, which will include free and fair elections. The EU will use a combination of sanctions and economic supports to gain cooperation of both sides.

· Should the EU not agree to get engaged, the OSCE might assume this role (unlikely as Russia may not want the US (an OSCE Participating State) to have a say in Belarus affairs).

· The OSCE will (Covid-19 permitting) ensure that future elections will be free and fair.

· The longer the protests continue, the greater chance that Government security forces will lose the battle for the hearts and minds of the Belarussian people.

· The clock is ticking. Street protests will be difficult to organise once winter sets in.