‘Groundhog’ or ‘Sitting Duck’? Why the Defence Forces need strong countermeasures against uncrewed and autonomous aerial vehicles — Part 2

By Andy Scollick, PhD

Part 1 looked at how peacekeepers are already being caught in the crossfire between parties, and how that danger is likely to increase due to proliferation of combat drones and loitering munitions.

Violent Non-State Actors

The Defence Forces on peace-support operations and other overseas deployments must contend with the proliferation of UAV technology from states to their proxies plus illegal armed groups, including violent extremist groups and terrorist organisations. In the Middle East, Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthi insurgents are the main actors regarding proliferation. Hezbollah began using UAVs for reconnaissance in November 2004. By August 2006, Hezbollah was mounting operations against Israel using UAVs with 40–50 kg explosive warheads. Palestinian militants Hamas acquired UAVs in 2010. In 2012, the IDF claimed to have disrupted a Hamas UAV development programme in the Gaza Strip. In May 2020, Hamas launched locally produced Shebab loitering munitions against Israel from the Strip. The Shebab resembles the Iranian Ababil series and variants used by Iranian-backed Houthi insurgents. Iranian-supplied UAVs and UAV technology will almost certainly continue to arm Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere.

It is unsurprising that illegal armed groups have weaponised commercially available UAVs to facilitate asymmetric attacks against state adversaries. In Syria in late 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began using small fixed-wing UAVs packed with explosives as improvised loitering munitions. By January 2017, the group had formed its own UAV unit and increased its rate of UAV attacks. ISIS also rely on small quadcopter and other multi-rotor UAVs to drop small munitions on targets, using UAVs and parts purchased from websites and other commercial sources.

In January 2018, an Islamist faction in Syria deployed a suite of 13 commercial UAVs modified to carry bombs in an attack against Russian military targets at Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base in Latakia province. In Africa, in November 2018, Islamist extremist group Boko Haram reportedly began using UAVs for surveillance of the Nigerian Army. Regardless of efforts by states to limit the sale, export and use of military-grade UAVs and associated operator control units, it is highly probable that UAV proliferation will continue to gather pace globally; especially given the ready availability, relatively low cost and simplicity of commercial platforms.

Violent non-state actors will almost certainly continue to develop increasingly sophisticated UAV systems capabilities based on technologies available on the white, grey and black markets; and on the reverse-engineering of downed and captured military-grade UAVs.

Countering the Inevitable

In the coming years, state militaries will become increasingly vulnerable as UAV technology continues to develop. Whether in Lebanon, elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa, the Western Balkans or on some future UN or EU mandated overseas deployment, Defence Forces personnel will likely encounter state and non-state actors armed with UCAVs and loitering munitions. Regardless of whether Irish peacekeepers and observers are caught in crossfire or targeted directly, the Defence Forces require effective countermeasures protection against all types of UAV.

A comprehensive defence against UAVs involves a multi-layered counter uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) architecture and system functionality to detect, identify and track a single target, multiple targets or even an entire drone swarm before mitigating or neutralising the potential threat through non-kinetic or kinetic solutions.

Drone monitoring equipment enables 360-degree ‘full-sky’ coverage using four main types of equipment: radio frequency analysers, radar, acoustic sensors and optical, electro-optical or infrared cameras. Early detection and identification prepare the C-UAS system for an efficient response, including engagement of the target or targets by methods including:

• Electronic jamming to disrupt a UAV’s global positioning system radio navigation or radio control signals, or signal ‘spoofing’ to take over navigation and control of the UAV.
• Cyber operations to interrupt communications links between a control centre and the UAV.
• Physically capturing a UAV mid-flight using a net either fired from a gun or deployed from an attack UAV to entangle the target’s propellers and immobilise it.
• Physically disrupting or destroying a UAV using either directed energy (high-power microwave and laser) beams or a projectile such as a bullet, missile or smart airburst munition.

Numerous defence companies around the world are engaged in the development of C-UAS systems. It is a fast-moving and competitive field: there is already a race by companies to develop not only countermeasures, but also solutions that counter the countermeasures. In turn, drives efforts to further develop both C-UAS and UAV systems.

No Need to be ‘Sitting Ducks’

The Defence Forces must keep apace with such developments and ensure that they have the necessary flexibility to adapt to future operating environments in which the lethality from UCAV and loitering munition use is exponentially greater than at present. Planning for force protection against such aerial threats is needed now. It cannot be put off until 2030. By then, Defence Forces personnel on peacekeeping and rapid response missions overseas will likely be ‘Groundhog’ in situations involving a mix of semi and fully autonomous UAVs.

Are bomb shelters, bunkers and command posts designed sufficiently to prevent a small loitering munition from flying through the entrance, into the interior, before detonating? Do Defence Forces armoured vehicles have sufficient armour and active protection systems to counter a top attack by precision guided munitions launched from a UCAV platform? What mobile C-UAS system do foot patrols need to protect them from a fully autonomous swarm of reconnaissance drones and loitering munitions?

These are just some of the questions that not only Irish military commanders, but also Irish politicians and civil servants will be faced with when making decisions regarding overseas deployments.

When it comes to uncrewed and autonomous vehicles, we must acknowledge that force development will always require continuing adaptation and upgrading of capabilities in order to meet the challenges they pose. Defence planning and procurement must factor in the need for swift replacement of older C-UAS systems and acquisition of new capabilities in order to keep Defence Forces personnel protected. The onus is on government and policy makers is to implement a procurement system that not only keeps up with the rapid pace of UAV-related technology development, but also keeps ahead of it in terms of foresight. There is little point, after a long procurement process, in acquiring yesterday’s outdated and ineffective C-UAS systems.

Therefore, the Defence Forces would benefit from establishing a specialised branch or office to address UAV and C-UAS development. Its role would be to continually monitor technological advances and uses, and make recommendations regarding planning and procurement. Such a branch or office would liaise closely with other militaries, the private sector and academia. Furthermore, it could more broadly be responsible for uncrewed and autonomous systems and other emerging and disruptive technologies in general.

About the Author

Dr. Andy Scollick is an independent consultant in the field of European and transatlantic security and defence. He specialises in the interconnections between climate change and defence, emerging and disruptive technologies, systems thinking, design of governance architecture and the development of resilience-based approaches. Since 2014, he has worked as a policy analyst and advisor to government, military and civil society actors in Ukraine, the Baltic states and other countries regarding the development and implementation of security and defence policy. Andy holds a PhD in sustainability science, complex adaptive systems theory and maritime governance from UCC where he also worked as an EU project researcher and lecturer.