‘Groundhog’ or ‘Sitting Duck’? Why the Defence Forces need strong countermeasures against uncrewed and autonomous aerial vehicles — Part 1
By Andy Scollick, PhD
In five, 10, 15 years’ time we can expect Irish peacekeepers to find themselves in situations where they are pinned down not only by artillery crossfire, but also by combat drones and loitering munitions. Therefore, it is essential that the Defence Forces have the capabilities to detect, identify, counter and protect against such emerging threats.
Caught in the Crossfire
Defence Forces’ personnel on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping duties in southern Lebanon are no stranger to ‘Groundhog’, the codeword to take cover in designated bomb shelters. In May 2021, while global attention was focused on the Gaza Strip, the UN ‘Blue Line’ border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel once again became a hot zone. Irish peacekeepers serving with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) received Groundhog alerts when Palestinian militants fired rockets toward northern Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) returned artillery fire.
A similar Groundhog incident took place on 1 September 2019, when a number of Israeli mortar rounds and artillery shells fell into the Irish peacekeepers’ area of operations. It is, of course, not only Defence Forces personnel who are at risk in Southern Lebanon: UNIFIL’s force currently consists of 10,243 peacekeepers from 46 countries.
On 28 January 2015, as a result of IDF artillery fire, a Spanish peacekeeper at a UNIFIL position on the border of the Golan Heights sustained serious injuries that resulted in his death. On 25 July 2006, four unarmed members of the UN Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), which supports UNIFIL, were killed when IDF artillery shells and aerial bombs struck their patrol base. The three-story building they were in was totally destroyed. The military observers were from Austria, Canada, Finland and China.
This event took place during heavy exchanges of fire along the length of the Blue Line between 12 July and 14 August in what became known as the 2006 Lebanon War. Numerous incidents of firing by both sides took place close to UN positions. Several positions, including the UNIFIL headquarters itself, received multiple direct hits mainly from IDF artillery shells and mortar rounds, but also from tank rounds, and aerial bombs and rockets. This resulted in significant material damage to buildings, vehicles and supplies.
In addition to the four OGL observers killed, an Indian peacekeeper was seriously wounded by shrapnel from IDF tank fire (16 July). One unarmed OGL military observer was seriously wounded by small arms fire (23 July). Four members of the UNIFIL Ghanaian battalion were lightly wounded by an IDF tank round (24 July). An Israeli aerial rocket exploded above a UNIFIL position moderately wounding two Indian peacekeepers (29 July). Three Chinese peacekeepers were lightly wounded by a Hezbollah mortar round (6 August). A Hezbollah rocket impacted inside the UNIFIL headquarters in Naquora lightly wounding one French peacekeeper (10 August). A Ghanaian peacekeeper was wounded when two Israeli artillery rounds impacted inside a UNIFIL position (12 August). On 12–13 August, 85 Israeli artillery shells impacted inside UNIFIL positions causing massive material damage to all of them; all UNIFIL personnel were forced into shelters for the entire period, preventing casualties.
Step Change in Lethality
Peacekeepers from Ireland and elsewhere are already exposed to significant danger in southern Lebanon. However, such incidents could become more serious should Hezbollah and the IDF begin to engage each other across the Blue Line using armed drone technology. In particular, uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and loitering munitions.
A UCAV is an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) that serves as a platform for weapons such as guided air-to-surface missiles and smart bombs. We are all familiar with the American Predator and Reaper long-endurance UCAVs used in the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria.
A loitering munition (also known as a ‘suicide drone’ or ‘kamikaze drones) is a type of expendable UAV with an integral explosive warhead. They are designed to loiter in the air, while gathering intelligence and tracking potential targets, before switching function to that of a guided missile: locked on to a target for a precision strike, mid-flight abort, potential recommit or ditch without detonation depending on the operator’s decision — assuming that there is a ‘human-in-the-loop’ to retain control. A fully autonomous terminal guidance mode relies on artificial intelligence (AI) to make the rapid final decisions. Theoretically, loitering munitions have an increased capacity to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants compared to equivalent weapon systems such as mortars, rockets and missiles.
As with unarmed UAVs used for intelligence-gathering, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), armed UCAVs and loitering munitions can be designed to act in swarms. In practical terms, a human operator directs the swarm to the mission area and then the largely autonomous swarm takes over and accomplishes the mission according to onboard AI computing and programmed rules governing swarming behaviour.
Swarms can consist of different types of UAV with specialised roles: unarmed information gatherers and communicators that inform UCAVs and loitering munitions about target locations, as well as decoy UAVs to draw air defence fire. Constant communication between elements of the swarm allows them to coordinate target selection and approach for maximum attack efficiency. Countering concurrently deployed drones on the battlefield is a difficult challenge. Countering swarming drones takes it to another level.
Overall, the coordinated use of UCAVs and loitering munitions can generate a significant increase in lethality. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war demonstrated that superiority on the battlefield can be achieved — in this case, by Azerbaijan’s military — with the help of a combination of UAVs. Azerbaijani forces used different types of unarmed ISTAR UAVs (supplied mainly by Israel) to identify Armenian air defence assets on the ground. This was followed by precision strikes by Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs armed with laser-guided smart bombs to suppress air defences. This then cleared the path for TB2 and Israeli Harop, Orbiter 1K and SkyStriker loitering munition strikes on a wider range of Armenian ground targets, including tanks and other armoured vehicles, artillery systems, troop transports, command posts, bunkers, fuel and ammunition dumps, and exposed infantry.
The videos of drone attacks on Armenian forces distributed by the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan are too visceral to include here. However, they clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of drone warfare; and, at the time, they had significant propaganda and psychological operations value against the Armenian side.
Part 2 will look at the use of UAV technology by violent non-state actors, drone countermeasures and what the Defence Forces need to do to avoid becoming ‘sitting ducks’.
