Investigating Crimes of War: Experiences and Issues (part 5)
‘Weapons Testing and Marketing and Depleted Uranium’
By Col Des Travers (ret’d)
About the author: having served for 42 years career with the Irish Army, Des Travers’ last appointment was as Colonel, Commandant of the Military College. In his time, he served with UNFICYP (1964, 1969–70), UNIFIL (1980–82, 1984–85 and 1987–88), in Croatia (EU Monitor in 1993) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000–01) before retiring in 2001.
In 2003, Travers was invited join the Institute for International Criminal Investigations based in The Hague. He later became a director at the Institute. Asked to participate in the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, the report submitted to the Human Rights Council on 30 Sep 2009 has come to be known as “The Goldstone Report”.
Weapons Testing and Marketing
In the course of my military analysis experience, one issue above all others that calls for attention is that of weapons testing. By ‘weapons testing’, I mean new weapons or systems that are ushered into a conflict for marketing purposes. In my estimation, I have encountered at least four test/ marketing munitions incidents. These are: the previously mentioned micro-shrapnel incident; the use of a mine-clearing munition (called ‘Carpet’) in a suburban area; the use of a thermobaric or fuel-air bomb in a basement; and the use of a new indirect firing weapon into a crowded street.
It is not at all unusual for weapons manufacturers to usher their products into a war zone so that they can be marketed as ‘war tested’. Where this becomes very problematic is when the ‘war’ itself is deemed unlawful and where the ‘targets’ for the weapons trial are indiscriminate or are non-combatants.
One weapons trial sets the scene for all that is wrong with unrestricted development and marketing of defence materiel. The test involved an indirect fire weapon known as Keshet whose systems had been automated. The target was a market street on a busy market day. The street was not accessible to other conventional indirect fire weapons as buildings on both sides would ‘trap’ the descent of artillery shells.
Drones hovered overhead to capture the shoot. The shoot involved firing bombs along the street at such short intervals that those targeted would be frozen or unable to respond or flee towards the next impact further along the street.
Three impacts each necessitated rapid adjustment to sights and gun alignment so employed. The shoot accounted for over thirty fatalities and a similar number of serious wounded, not to mention killing of livestock and destruction of farm produce.
Spokespersons justifying this attack stated that it was an attack on terrorists. It was noted that among the ‘terrorists’ they listed was a thirteen year old boy.
A kafkaesque quandary seeps into the human rights investigation field — and especially so the medical care communities — when they catalogue the consequences of this action. Their information is what the weapons testers need; it confirms or proves the lethality of their product and is available at no cost to them in receiving it. Moreover, this is data that cannot be replicated in a range or lawful test facility.
In effect, it pays to test weapons or market them in an area of conflict, so called. Weapons manufacturers will continue to do so until some measures are put in place to prevent them from doing it.
Depleted Uranium (DU)
I became concerned by this next and last munition when it was used very surgically to destroy border tunnel systems in a recent conflict. The munitions used had been imported as a one-off initiative from a major western manufactory.
After the bombing, military engineers removed the soil over the impact sites to a depth of about six feet, and then replaced it with fresh soil brought in from elsewhere. The implications of this last event are obvious.
Not so obvious to some technical colleagues, however, are the hazards associated with (DU), if not at the user end then perhaps at the impact site. As a debating point, the DU issue produces an overlap between science and conspiracy theory; users and victims; guns and targets; and so on. Suffice it to suggest that our duty of care to soldiers as peacekeepers requires us to have due consideration in committing them to a mission in which DU munitions have been used. At least one government thought so and withdrew their peacekeepers without explanation.
[There will be a number of follow on instalments to this posting: Part 6 will discuss the issues of Media and Modern Crime.]
