KABUL CHAOS BRINGS BACK MEMORIES OF US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA
Dorcha Lee*
The big surprise of the Afghanistan debacle was not the decision to withdraw itself, but the manner in which it was conducted. This was a problematic operation from the moment a fixed departure date was announced and advertised to all and sundry. Because of poor preparation, thousands of Afghan employees of the US, and their allies, were left to their fate. In the UK embassy, documents with lists of their Afghan employees were left strewn around the embassy compound.
The inventory of military equipment left behind by the US is jaw-dropping, enough to ensure that the Taliban will remain in power for decades to come. Was this intentional? If so, the US Congress will be asking President Biden why were US taxpayers paying for arming the Taliban? Conspiracy theorists please note!
Withdrawal and evacuation scenarios are a normal part of contingency planning for military operations, including peacekeeping missions. So, what went wrong in Afghanistan? The US military have a long tradition of professional contingency planning and they have the best logistics system in the World. A number of analysts have already jumped to the conclusion that it was a failure of intelligence. Given that the US forces and their allies were in Afghanistan for twenty years, this is simply not credible. They must have had full knowledge of Taliban and Government forces’ capabilities, deployments, equipment, state of morale, leadership and, indeed, plans.
An obvious question is why did the Afghan Army not fight? Did they receive instructions not to fight? What support was provided by third parties to the Taliban for example, from Pakistan and Iran? If this support was significant, what did the US and their allies do about it?
The most dangerous moment in an evacuation comes at the very end when, inevitably, the evacuating force loses operational control of the situation. Comparisons are being made with the ‘Saigon Moment’ where helicopters had to rescue the US Ambassador and staff from the roof of the US Embassy in ‘75.
However, the main comparison, that might be made, is with Somalia in the early nineties. Somalia showed how quickly the US could reach a decision to withdraw under pressure of public opinion. It also showed how a beleaguered UN force, taken relatively heavy casualties, could plan and conduct a withdrawal and evacuation without the chaos we have seen in Kabul.
In December ’92, a US led coalition force was deployed to stabilise the security situation, so that humanitarian aid, being interrupted by warlords, could get through to avert a famine. This operation began with a night-time amphibious landing by US marines along the shark infested beaches of Mogadishu. There was no resistance. The sharks fled. Instead, the international media were set up with TV cameras, ready to record the moment as the marines came ashore!
The US -led operation was a great success. Ten of thousands of Somali lives were saved. However, in March ’93, the 35,000 strong coalition force handed over to a weaker UN force, called UNOSOM 11. The UN mission was given a much more difficult mandate, effectively to achieve and maintain security throughout the country to facilitate a political solution. A US ranger battalion, not part of UNOSOM, was deployed to Mogadishu and started to conduct a separate security operation. Through poor intelligence they lost 18 rangers killed and 85 wounded in the incident later known as ‘Black Hawk Down’. Unlike Afghanistan, where the US forces had twenty years to build up their intelligence, they were less than a year in Somalia and seriously underestimated Gen Aidid’s militia. Instead of a partly trained militia of 500 the elite rangers found themselves surrounded by a force of 3000 fighters, led by former Italian and Russian trained Somali Army officers. The US rangers fought valiantly, but were in unfamiliar terrain, the narrow back streets of Mogadishu. The militia attacks were very effectively coordinated by the latest wonder of modern technology, the mobile phone.
The sight of a dead ranger’s body being dragged by a jeep though the streets of Mogadishu broke the will of the Clinton Administration to remain in Somalia.
In less than two years, 500 UN troops were killed and wounded, and the final decision was taken to withdraw from Somalia. The US and the main European contingents were withdrawn first. The withdrawal/ evacuation planning and execution was conducted by UNOSOM Force Command HQ and Administration. UN agencies and foreign NGO humanitarian staff handed over to Somali local staff and, along with those Somalis who were in danger, left in good order by commercial means. UN humanitarian projects were rapidly funded up, helping to restore relations between local communities and the UN. Crucially the Port and Airport at Mogadishu were secured by UN troops at all times. The Indian Navy provided ‘over the horizon’ cover in the event of a breakdown in security.
Given the heavy fighting and casualties that had already occurred in Mogadishu, the evacuation could have been a bloodbath. Instead, it was professionally completed in Mar ’95, with minimal loss of life.
Much has been made of recent negotiations conducted by the US directly with the Taliban. A deal was struck, behind the backs of the Afghan Government, who were forced last year, by the US, to release 5,000 Taliban fighters held in captivity. Inexplicably, the US’s closest allies were not even consulted. No wonder they are angry.
I suppose, at the end of the day, you make peace with your enemies, not your friends.
*Defence Analyst, and former Senior Staff Officer Coordination, UNOSOM Force Command, Somalia.
